Civilian Protection and International Humanitarian Law: Marking the 70th Anniversary of 1949 Geneva Conventions with ICRC President

The All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group (PHRG) held a Parliamentary Roundtable with Peter Maurer, President of the ICRC, on 6 March 2019, to explore the impact of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in protecting civilians & civilian infrastructure in armed conflict.

We would like to thank Liz McInnes MP for chairing this event.

The speaker was: Peter Maurer, President, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The main points raised were:

  • The ICRC is at the frontlines of conflict and has practical experience of the respect and non-respect for the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (GCs).
  • The ICRC has a mandate through the GCs to support state and non-state actors in their respect of InternationaI Humanitarian Law (IHL). This model is a possible pathway for the future, because of the very real limitations of international bodies governed by states, which then have to regulate states and state practice.
  • His last field trip was to Mosul, Iraq, and when the level of destruction is seen, one can’t help but ask what happened here.
  • When talking to people in Syria and Iraq, their main preoccupation is missing family members. 70 years ago, GC drafters had thought about how to deal with missing people, and developed detailed regulations.
  • IHL and the GCs definitely remain relevant, though may no longer be complete.
  • IHL is consensus-based law, based on reciprocity: one treats detainees humanely because one expects the other side to do so. But trust has now broken down between belligerents, which is a challenge.
  • GCs are a practical tool which guides states and non-state actors, with provisions to protect health facilities and schools included for good reason, though their targeting is a big concern today.
  • Proportionality, distinction and precaution limit the use of force; these three principles remain highly relevant.
  • Engagement with states and non-state actors on these fundamental principles remains critical. The ICRC deals with 130+ armed forces, as regards training, operational reviews and dialogue, as well as having contact with 250+ non-state armed groups, to stress the importance of respect for IHL.
  • Public perception is that IHL law is not respected and therefore irrelevant. But despite all the violations, it is interesting to note how many military operations are conducted with respect for IHL.
  • Urban warfare and counter-terrorism operations are big issues of concern in battlefields today. IHL has to be applicable: we have nothing better.
  • We need to build bridges of interpretation, moving from a history of inter-state warfare to the conflicts we have now, e.g. asymmetric warfare, terrorism.
  • States and non-state groups are equally responsible for IHL violations.
  • There are also concerns about partnered warfare, i.e., when one State or group is engaged in conflict via a partner State or group which conducts the military operations themselves; the GCs influence here too. In Syria, Yemen and Iraq, we need to look at the bigger picture as to who influences the battlefield and what support can be given to an armed party in a conflict, e.g., training, delivery of weapons, logistical and digital support, and, analytical capacity. Where does a state’s responsibility lie when it delegates to partners, and how can the influence of a supporting party be used to good effect?
  • Should the ICRC be more proactive to identify the gaps in the GCs? There is reluctance as there is no consensus on how to develop law today that would be sufficiently precise to meet the challenges. Bilateral and small multilateral conversations are taking place but the time is not right to take a major step like in 1949, after WWII.
  • As regards cyber warfare, cyber security, AI, etc., the time is not right for global legislation but for discussions.
  • Development of new weapons: are they in sync with IHL? Biological weapons and chemical had to be prohibited because they cannot be used in accordance with the fundamental principles of precaution and proportionality. The use of some other weapons may have to be limited for the same reasons.
  • Re. treatment of IS fighters and their families in detention in foreign countries, the ICRC visits detainees in Iraq and Syria, in the camps where families of foreign fighters are held. If those in the camps ask to return to their countries, the ICRC will try to facilitate the transfer of children and women back to their countries of origin. But IHL law and bilateral relations will come into it. Stripping people of their nationality, however, is not a good way forward; decisions which result in statelessness leave people without protection. Have to caution against creating a new generation of statelessness people. The ICRC tries to bring back children/minors who don’t have parents; this is fairly straightforward. More than 100 countries have foreign fighters in detention in Syria and Iraq.
  • Re. partnered warfare, a lot can be done to ensure responsibility is exercised if there’s the political will, e.g., establishing ground rules, review of operations and targeting decisions in combat operations. Examining decision-making chains is also important if partners are to be supported in taking decisions that protect civilians. Arms transfers are another aspect. Under which conditions does the state transfer/export weapons – with IHL conditionality? States have developed product responsibility for consumers, yet arms are exported to highly contested environments where they can do huge damage.
  • The ICRC believes accountability for war crimes is absolutely critical but there is a price to be paid for a neutral humanitarian actor’s access. If the ICRC were part of accountability and justice processes, that access would be drastically reduced: the ICRC currently visits 1 million detainees a year and delivers services to many of the most affected in conflict situations. We must think together and strike separately. The ICRC is the only organisation exempt from having to testify before the International Criminal Court. We need separate strong credible institutions to deal with different functions.
  • As regards mass graves, while the ICRC supports capacity-building for forensic identification, ICRC cannot be an identifier of those in mass graves. The humanitarian line (e.g., caring for families seeking information about the missing) must be kept separate from other responsibilities allowing for adjudication of cases. Silos are needed in this case.
  • The safety of those who deliver humanitarian assistance is a big preoccupation. In terms of numbers killed, staff security remains the same. There are collateral damage cases, when staff are too close to the frontline and accidentally hit, but now there are deliberate attacks in order to make humanitarian workers leave to punish the civilian population. The radicalisation and fragmentation of groups also make it difficult to know who has to be consulted so humanitarian workers can operate safely. There are 35 different armed groups in Yemen in one city; to securitise the humanitarian operation is mind-boggling. In some conflicts now, e.g., Nigeria and Afghanistan, fighters can establish themselves as radicals by killing a humanitarian worker, and get more support. Public advocacy for an independent humanitarian presence is therefore critical. Criminalisation of humanitarian workers by states that consider that some humanitarian work to be criminal, e.g., medical treatment of terrorist combatants, is also a considerable concern.

The PHRG is delighted to have hosted the ICRC President to discuss the on-going importance of respect for IHL, particularly as regards civilian protection, with UK Parliamentarians, and will continue to raise related matters with all relevant interlocutors.

12/07/17: The Lake Chad Crisis – A Silent Emergency

The All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group (PHRG) held a joint panel discussion, in conjunction with the British Red Cross, on the Lake Chad Crisis on 12 July to raise greater awareness about the current crisis in the Lake Chad region, and to explore what more needs to be done to alleviate human suffering there and, ultimately, to resolve the crisis.

We would like to thank Rt Hon Ann Clwyd, PHRG Chair, for chairing this event.

The speakers were:

  • H. E. Matthew Rycroft CBE – UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (MR);
  • Alexander Matheou – Executive Director of the British Red Cross, International Directorate (AM);
  • Markus Geisser – Senior Humanitarian Affairs & Policy Adviser, ICRC (MG);
  • Dr Natalie Roberts – Head of Emergency Operations, Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) France (NR);
  • Kate Osamor MP – Chair, Nigeria APPG (KO).

 

The main points raised were as follows:

  • This crisis in north-east Nigeria is in its eighth year and now has a regional dimension, with spill-over in Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Excessive counter-insurgency tactics have served to undermine food production. (MG) There are currently 10 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. (AM)
  • The British Red Cross appeal for the Lake Chad crisis has raised comparatively less than other emergencies of this scale, particularly in comparison to the Nepal earthquake appeal where millions were raised in a few days. With a long-running crisis situation such as this, it can be harder to mobilise the humanitarian response. (AM)  Similarly, the UN programme in connection with the Lake Chad crisis has only been 23% funded; there is a large gap between the money pledged and the money received.  DFID, however, has provided £100 million to help the most vulnerable. (MR)
  • National Red Cross societies, which are present in all the affected countries, are the first respondents.  The ICRC has dedicated £140 million to the Lake Chad crisis, as much as its funding for Syria. Cash payments are being provided to those in need to stimulate local economies and there is also a focus on long-term food production, healthcare, water and water supply systems, and family tracing programmes. (MG)
  • Many people are trapped between the insurgency and counter-insurgency operations. People who live in camps are effectively stuck as they become dependent on aid and are unable to move freely as either they are not allowed to leave or the military or civilian vigilantes screen them each time they leave and re-enter, with levels of extortion often involved.  The military fears that any aid supplies given to those in the camps could be passed on to members of Boko Haram. International NGOs therefore often have very limited access to these camps and restrictions on the aid they are able to provide, while they have no access to people living in areas of territory which are not under military control. (NR)
  • Lack of respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a key issue in this crisis. (AM) It is important that all parties to the conflict are made aware of their obligations in relation to IHL, though the nature of asymmetric warfare means that the nature of relations with warring parties is asymmetric. Those with influence on the warring parties should ensure there is compliance with IHL, e.g., by encouraging investigations into alleged IHL breaches. (MG)
  • There are reports of refugees being forcibly returned, which is contrary to IHL. The UK Government has a strong relationship with the Nigerian Government, as does France with Cameroon, which can help to influence on topics such as these. Violations of IHL must be investigated and those responsible held accountable. In the longer-term, respect for IHL is the way to defeat terrorism. (MR)
  • MR led a UN Security Council visit to the Lake Chad region and met with many people impacted by the crisis. It was evident that climate change, poor governance and Boko Haram activity are factors driving this crisis.(MR)
  • The UK drafted the UNSC Resolution 2349 on the Lake Chad crisis after the visit.  The Resolution is meant to highlight the need for an integrated approach, as well as sustained international engagement, to resolve the crisis. (MR)
  • There needs to be cooperation by states in the region to create a long-term plan to demobilise and reintegrate Boko Haram fighters. (MR)
  • The debate on this crisis is not moving fast enough and there needs to be an honest discussion on what is needed. For example, on the issue of climate change: some people who have been displaced cannot go back home. It is also key that money pledged goes towards supporting women and rebuilding communities where there are now no men and nothing left, and to provide mental health support. We need to look holistically at the people and their communities. (KO)

 

The PHRG will continue to monitor the situation in the Lake Chad region closely and to raise its concerns, particularly in connection with civilian protection, with the relevant interlocutors.